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Abstract
We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a stan-
dard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an
observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects an agent’s individual
contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous
inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aver-
sion may be beneficial; in the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest
rates, relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates
reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents.
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”Implicit contracts can be effective only in a social atmosphere
that incorporates a sense of mutual respect and a consensus on
principles of fair play and good faith.”
Arthur M. Okun1
1. Introduction
The present paper investigates how concerns for fairness among agents
affect the optimal provision of incentives in a one-task framework with only
subjective performance measures. In particular, we analyze the impact of
horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion on the principal’s credibility in a
relational contract. So far the literature has focused on the impact of inequity
aversion on the design of explicit incentive contracts. In these environments,
employing inequity averse agents comes at a cost for the principal. In contrast
to that, we find that with implicit incentives, the principal might prefer to
employ inequity averse, rather than inequity neutral, agents.
Frequently, if not typically, the agent’s true contribution to firm value can-
not be objectively assessed. In many cases, his contribution can, nonetheless,
be observed by both contracting parties. The observed subjective perfor-
mance may be used in implicit agreements (relational contracts). As subjec-
tive assessments are not verifiable by third parties, contracts are not court-
enforceable and thus have to be self-enforcing. They may be implemented in
long-term relationships as reputational equilibria.2
So far the literature on relational contracts has primarily focused on prob-
lems under symmetric information.3 Apart from that, there is an evolving
literature analyzing self-enforcing contracts under asymmetric information,
in particular moral hazard in effort (Baker et al., 1994, 2002; Levin, 2003;
Kvaløy and Olsen, 2006; Scho¨ttner, 2008). We contribute to the latter strand
of literature by analyzing fairness concerns that may arise in multilateral con-
tracting under ex-post asymmetric information.
1Okun (1980), p. 8.
2Reputational equilibria may exist if one party cares about her reputation in future
relationships. See e.g. Holmstro¨m (1981) or Baker et al. (2002).
3See e.g. Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), and Levin (2002).
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As the agents’ contributions to firm value are not necessarily perfectly
correlated to their efforts, agents undertaking the same effort could receive
different rewards. This might provoke envy, empathy, or spiteful behavior
among agents, especially if they work on similar tasks.4 Taking into ac-
count the presence of envy among agents, we investigate the feasibility and
profitability of relational contracts.
We consider an employment relationship between one principal and two
risk neutral, not financially constrained agents who exhibit disadvantageous
inequity aversion. We have in mind employees working on similar tasks
in small or medium-size firms or divisions where workers tend to compare
their payoffs with those of their colleagues.5 Specifically, we model prefer-
ences as “self-centered inequity aversion”, as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), abstracting from empathy.6 Neither agent’s effort is directly observ-
able by the principal, albeit imperfectly correlated with individual perfor-
mance. The principal seeks to mitigate the resulting moral hazard problem
by offering each agent an incentive contract contingent on their respective
performances. As observed performance is not verifiable, the contract has to
be self-enforcing; i.e., reputation concerns have to restrain the principal from
deviating from the incentive contract.
It is well known that, with explicit incentives, more envious agents exert
more effort than less envious ones when being offered identical incentive
contracts (Grund and Sliwka, 2005; Demougin and Fluet, 2006). However,
to ensure participation, the principal has to pay the inequity averse agents a
premium to compensate them for the faced risk of unequal payoffs (inequity
premium). In this kind of framework, agency costs increase in the presence
of inequity aversion as reported by, e.g., Bartling and von Siemens (2007)
and Grund and Sliwka (2005).7 Both results are true for our model as long
4For experimental evidence of other-regarding preferences see e.g. Goranson and
Berkowitz (1966), Berg et al. (1995), Fehr et al. (1998), and Fehr et al. (1997).
5E.g., according to a survey study by Bewley (1998), workers indeed compare them-
selves with other workers within their firm whereas workers’ pay in other firms has little
effect. While an agent may also care about the principal’s well-being (vertical inequity
aversion), we are interested in inequity averse preferences among agents within the firm
and the effects thereof for the optimality of employment schemes.
6For alternative approaches regarding the formalization of fairness concerns see e.g.
Rabin (1993), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
7This holds under unlimited liability which is the case we consider. Under limited
3
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as only one period is considered. Here, the principal would rather employ
inequity neutral than inequity averse agents.
The present paper analyzes how this conclusion is affected under a rela-
tional contract. The principal’s credibility constraint requires that her gains
from reneging fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the rela-
tional contract. We find that this constraint is ambiguously affected by the
presence of envy; on the one hand, the incentive for the principal to deviate
from the relational contract in order to save bonus expenses decreases in the
propensity for envy. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that envious agents
work harder given the same incentive in order to avoid ending up with a
lower payoff than their colleagues. This facilitates credible commitment on
the principal’s side. On the other hand, as agents have to be compensated
for their disutility incurred by envy, the principal’s long-run profits out of
the contract decrease as agents become more envious. Consequently, com-
mitment to paying the offered bonus is more difficult.
The sum of these two counteracting effects determines whether credibility
is either more or less easily obtained by the principal as agents become more
envious. Whenever the savings due to lower bonus payments exceed the loss
of future profits via the inequity premium, credibility is enhanced by the
degree of envy and, for some range of discount rates, the principal prefers to
employ more envious agents.
We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which, for a range
of the principal’s discount rate, relational contracts are less profitable, or even
infeasible, when agents do not exhibit any disadvantageous inequity aversion.
In that case, envy becomes an advantageous factor in principal-agent rela-
tionships in the sense that it softens the principal’s credibility constraint and
more reputational equilibria can be sustained with envious agents.
Our findings underline that empirically observed cultural differences in
social preferences should not be neglected in organizational decisions when
firms rely on implicit incentives. In particular, the implementation of re-
lational employment contracts might not be possible with inequity neutral
liability, it might not be true; wage costs may decrease in the agents’ inequity aversion as
long as they receive rents. See e.g. Demougin and Fluet (2003, 2006).
4
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agents if the principal’s discount rate is relatively low. Moreover, relational
contracts might be more profitable in countries where people generally ex-
hibit a greater degree of inequity aversion due to cultural differences. For
example, Alesina et al. (2004) and Corneo (2001) find Europeans to exhibit
a higher propensity for inequity aversion in comparison to U.S. Americans.8
Thus, the implementation of relational contracts might be more frequent
in countries whose populations are more sensitive to inequity aversion. Tak-
ing cultural differences in the degree of inequity aversion into consideration,
our findings support the empirical analysis by Moriguchi (2005). She argues
that relational contracts are more prevalent in Japan than in the United
States, pointing out that the United States were hit harder by the Great De-
pression compared to Japan. This goes along with lower continuation profits
and thus results in the less frequent use of relational contracts in the United
States. According to our analysis, a depreciation of future profits may have
a less severe impact on the feasibility of relational contracts if employees
are more strongly inequity averse. Hence, these countries’ differences in the
propensity for inequity aversion could also play a role for the explanation of
differences in institutional arrangements in this context.
Before proceeding with the analysis, two caveats are in order. First, our
main analysis focuses on individual bonus schemes. However, other con-
tracts, such as peer-dependent compensation schemes, might possibly be im-
plemented. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of rank-order tournaments
and team bonus contracts within our setting in a supplemental section and
relate the findings to the results for the individual bonus scheme.
Second, one has to be aware of the fact that for an individual’s perception
of fairness and equity, many determinants beside the colleague’s payoff may
play a role: e.g. effort, ability, education, gender, status etc. Cognition
of inequity is presumably affected by mutual comparisons regarding all the
mentioned characteristics. In our model, due to the agents’ homogeneity in
both preferences and characteristics, differences in payoffs are the sole source
of inequity. Hence, payoff inequality accords with inequity.
8For a recent empirical cross-country investigation of preferences for redistribution see
Isaksson and Lindskog (2007). The study’s findings suggest that Swedish, Hungarian, and
German people are more supportive of redistribution than U.S. Americans.
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The next section describes our basic framework. Subsection 2.1 addresses
the agency problem in the single-period game. Subsection 2.2 develops the
reputation game, and thereby the relational contract. In section 3, we exam-
ine the impact of the agents’ propensity for envy on the relational contracts
and derive our main results concerning the principal’s credibility problem.
Section 4 discusses alternative compensation schemes. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a repeated game between a principal (the firm) and two
agents who are homogeneous in preferences and characteristics.9 In each pe-
riod, agent i, i = 1, 2, chooses an unobservable effort level ei that stochasti-
cally determines the agent’s contribution to firm value Yi. That contribution
is either high or low; Yi ∈ {0, 1}. The signal Yi is observable by all three
contracting parties but not verifiable; it can therefore only be used as a per-
formance measure in a self-enforcing relational contract. By exerting effort
agent i affects the probability of Yi = 1:
Pr[Yi = 1|ei] = p(ei), (1)
where p (ei) ∈ [0, 1), p (0) = 0, p′ (ei) > 0, and p′′ (ei) < 0. The agents’
outputs are stochastically independent.
The principal offers each agent an individual incentive contract consisting
of a fixed wage w and a per-period bonus b to be paid if a favorable signal is
detected in that respective period.10 Provided that the principal keeps her
promise, the bonus is paid whenever she observes Yi = 1. Thus, an agent’s
net monetary payoff is
pii − c(ei) = w + bYi − c (ei) , (2)
where c (ei) denotes each agent’s costs of effort with c (0) = 0, c
′ (0) = 0,
c′ (ei) > 0 ∀ ei > 0, and c′′ (ei) ≥ 0.
9Equivalently, we could assume the principal to employ many agents and approach the
problem from the perspective of one agent, all other agents forming his reference group.
10That is, we consider payment schemes without memory.
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Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), both agents exhibit inequity aversion.
In particular, we assume them to suffer only from disadvantageous inequity,
i.e., they dislike outcomes where they are worse off than the respective other
agent. Each agent observes the other agent’s gross monetary payoff. All
parties are risk neutral and not financially constrained. For simplicity, the
agents’ utilities are assumed to be linear in money. Altogether, agent i’s
per-period utility is given by
Ui (pii, pij) = pii − c(ei)− αmax{pij − pii, 0}, i 6= j, (3)
where α ≥ 0 denotes the agents’ propensity for envy. The third term thus
captures the disutility derived from being worse off than agent j.11
The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of
the period, the principal offers each agent the above specified compensation
contract. Second, the agents either accept the contract or reject it in favor
of an alternative employment opportunity that provides utility U0. Third, if
the agents accept the contract, they simultaneously choose respective effort
levels ei. Fourth, Yi is realized and observed by all parties. Finally, the agents
receive the explicit fixed wage, and if Yi = 1 the principal decides whether
or not to pay the implicit bonus.
2.1. The Single-Period Game
To derive the relational contract, we initially consider the single-period
game where we assume performance to be objectively assessable, i.e., there
is no credibility problem on the principal’s side. Given that agent j exerts
effort ej, agent i’s expected utility is
E[Ui|ei, ej] = w + p (ei) b− c (ei)− α(1− p (ei))p (ej) b, i 6= j, (4)
11Abstracting from costs, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose the following utility function:
Ui = pii − αmax{pij − pii, 0} − βmax{pii − pij , 0}, α > β ≥ 0. Incorporating empathy via
the parameter β would not affect our results qualitatively. For a brief discussion of status
preferences, β < 0, see section 5. Moreover, Demougin and Fluet (2006) take costs into
account when investigating inequity: Ui = pii− c (ei)−αmax{pij − c (ej)− pii + c (ei) , 0}.
This would change our results neither. However, an inconvenient discontinuity at the
symmetric Nash equilibrium would be introduced.
7
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where the last term captures the expected disutility from disadvantageous
inequity amounting to the difference in payoffs b. A symmetric Nash equi-
librium is characterized by
e = arg max
ê
E[Ui|ê, e]. (5)
In the Appendix, we verify that there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium
which is also unique. In equilibrium, the first-order condition yields
p′ (e) b− c′ (e) + αp′ (e) p (e) b = 0. (IC)
Thus, given that the agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion and
are faced with a contract with bonus b, they will undertake effort e, given
that (IC) is satisfied at e. Implicitly this defines a function
b (e;α) =
c′ (e)
(1 + αp (e)) p′ (e)
. (6)
Proposition 1. Under an individual bonus scheme, with an increasing propen-
sity for envy, the agents exert more effort for any given bonus.
Proof. Applying the implicit-function theorem to (IC) yields
de
dα
= − p
′ (e) p (e) b
p′′ (e) b (1 + αp (e))− c′′ (e) > 0. (7)

Intuitively, as envious agents suffer from being worse off than their co-
workers as opposed to non-envious agents, they exert relatively higher levels
of effort in order to decrease the probability of not getting the bonus. This
incentive-strengthening effect is in line with Demougin and Fluet (2006).12
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to it as the incentive effect.
12In the context of tournaments, Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet
(2003) report the same result. Kra¨kel (2008) identifies an incentive-strenghthening effect
when emotions play a role in tournaments.
8
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The principal’s profit per agent i is Vb = (1− b)Yi − w. Hence, in the
one-shot game, she sets b, w, and e to maximize expected profit per agent
subject to participation and incentive compatibility constraints:
max
b,w,e
(1− b) p(e)− w (8)
s.t. E[Ui|e] ≥ U0, (PC)
bp′ (e)− c′ (e) + αp′ (e) p (e) b = 0 (IC)
Since we assume unlimited liability, the participation constraint binds, lead-
ing to zero rent for the agents in the optimal contract. In equilibrium, for
each agent we have
w + p (e) b = c (e) + α(1− p (e))p (e) b+ U0. (9)
The second term on the right-hand side in equation (9) is the inequity pre-
mium. Hence, expected wage costs per agent are equal to the sum of his costs
of effort, his reservation utility, and the inequity premium. Substituting w
and b in the principal’s objective function by using (9) and (6), her problem
simplifies to
max
e
Vb (e;α) = p(e)− c (e)− αp(e) (1− p(e)) c
′ (e)
(1 + αp (e)) p′ (e)
−U0. (10)
Let e∗ denote the effort level that maximizes the principal’s expected one-
period profit Vb (e;α).
Proposition 2. Suppose that performance is verifiable. Then under an in-
dividual bonus scheme,
(i) the first-best solution is obtained if agents are not envious, α = 0.
(ii) the first-best solution can never be obtained if agents exhibit a propensity
for envy, α > 0.
(iii) total agency costs increase as agents become more envious.
Proof. As for the first part of the claim (i), observe that with α = 0, the
principal’s objective function (10) is
Vb (e; 0) = p(e)− c (e)− U0. (11)
9
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Optimization with respect to effort requires marginal productivity to equal
marginal costs of effort such that the first-best effort level e = eFB is im-
plemented. To prove (ii), with α > 0, in problem (10) the derivative of the
inequity premium, αp(e) (1− p(e)) c′ (e) · ((1 + αp (e)) p′ (e))−1, with respect
to effort is non-zero. Hence, profit-maximizing effort cannot be first-best. As
to (iii), using the envelope theorem, observe that the derivative of (10) w.r.t.
α is negative as − c′(e)
p′(e)
p(e)(1−p(e))
(p(e)α+1)2
< 0. 
For the case of non-envious agents, the individual bonus scheme involves
zero agency costs. However, when agents are envious the principal faces
positive agency costs despite the incentive effect. This result is due to the fact
that the principal needs to compensate the agents for the expected disutility
from inequity in order to ensure participation. We refer to this wage cost-
augmenting effect as the inequity premium effect. This result is in line with
the literature, see e.g. Bartling and von Siemens (2007) and Grund and
Sliwka (2005).
2.2. The Repeated Game
To model the relational contract, we embed the foregoing stage game
into an infinitely repeated game, considering trigger strategy equilibria. If the
principal reneges on the promised bonus once, no agent will ever again believe
her to fulfill the contract.13 Hence, the principal’s reputation is decisive for
her ability to implement relational contracts.
As effort is not observable, agents will exert zero effort if relational con-
tracts are infeasible, corresponding to a closure of the firm and resulting in
a fallback profit of zero. If relational contracts are feasible, the principal
realizes a continuation profit from the long-term relationship, corresponding
to expected profit Vb (e;α) defined in (10).
For the relational contract to be self-enforcing, the gains from reneging
must fall short of the gains from continuing the relational contract. This is
13Implicitly, we assume that the information on a principal’s deviation from the rela-
tional contract is rapidly transmitted to the labor market. As Baker et al. (1994) note,
each agent in the employment relationship could alternatively be represented by an infinite
sequence of agents, each of whom lives for one period, provided that each period’s agent
learns the history of play before the period begins. See also Bull (1987) for the role of
reputation in implicit contracts.
10
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required to hold for all realizations of performance. If both agents perform
successfully, Yi = Yj = 1, the principal’s incentive to renege on the rela-
tional contract is strongest as her resulting one-time benefit from deviation
amounts to twice the bonus. Concerning her reputation, it does not make
any difference whether she refuses to pay just one or both bonuses. Thus,
due to the separability of the profit function across workers
b (e;α) ≤ Vb (e;α)
r
(CC)
constitutes the credibility constraint of the principal (CC).14 The optimal
relational contract implements e to maximize the principal’s expected profit
per period, subject to her credibility constraint:
V ∗b (r, α) := max
e
Vb (e;α) , s.t. (CC) (12)
Whether condition (CC) can be satisfied or not, depends on the firm’s interest
rate r. To shed light on the interest rate’s impact on the optimal relational
contract we illustrate the credibility constraint with the help of an example in
Figure 1. Specifically, we assume α = 0.2, p (e) = 1− exp (−e), c (e) = 1
8
e2,
and U0 = 0.1. The figure plots the principal’s expected per-period profit
Vb (e;α). Moreover, the convex curves depict rb (e;α) for various discount
rates.
For a sufficiently low interest rate the credibility constraint does not bind.
Equivalently to the case of verifiable performance, the optimal relational
contract implements the profit-maximizing benchmark effort level e∗. We
denote the threshold interest rate for which (CC) becomes binding r. The
dashed line illustrates rb (e;α).
The solid curve depicts rb (e;α) for a medium interest rate where (CC)
is binding. To ensure credibility on the one hand and to maximize profits
14We derive the rationality constraint analogously to Baker et al. (1994). Note that
the interest rate r may be translated into the firm’s discount rate δ referring to, e.g., its
patience. Then r = (1− δ) /δ. Hart (2001) emphasizes the discount rate’s interpretation
as a measure for dependency or trust between the transacting parties. Alternatively, r can
be reinterpreted in terms of the likelihood that the firm disappeares from the market, ρ.
In that case r = ρ/ (1− ρ).
11
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rb (e; α)
e¯ e∗
e
Figure 1: Credibility Constraint for p (e) = 1 − exp (−e) , α = 0.2, c (e) = 18e2, and
U0 = 0.1.
on the other hand, the principal will always choose to implement the maxi-
mum effort level that just satisfies condition (CC). Geometrically, it is given
by the highest possible effort level for which Vb (e;α) and rb (e;α) intersect.
The figure illustrates that the optimal effort level declines as the principal’s
interest rate or the agents’ alternative utilities increase. Intuitively, raising
the interest rate implies the present value of contract continuation to de-
crease. Therefore the principal has to reduce the bonus in order to remain
credible which implies the implementation of a lower effort level. Analogous
arguments apply to an increase in the alternative utility.
As long as the credibility constraint can be fulfilled via adjustment of
the implemented effort level for some given r, contracts are feasible. For a
sufficiently high interest rate condition (CC) can no longer be satisfied. The
marginal interest rate r for which (CC) can just be fulfilled is characterized
by rb (e;α) being tangent to Vb (e;α). We denote the effort level implemented
at this threshold e. Relational contracts are infeasible for any interest rate
larger than the threshold interest rate r. The dotted line, rb (e;α), represents
this marginal case.
12
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3. The Impact of Envy on the Optimal Relational Bonus Contract
In this section, we analyze the effect of the agents’ propensity for envy
on the profitability and feasibility of the optimal relational contract. Closer
examination of condition (CC) reveals the impact of envy to be twofold. On
the one hand, as shown in Proposition 1, we observe the incentive effect ;
de
dα
> 0. For a given effort level, it implies that the principal can reduce
the bonus as agents become more envious.15 Consequently, the incentive
of a one-time deviation from the relational contract in order to save bonus
expenses decreases. On the other hand, the inequity premium effect lowers
the principal’s profit from contract continuation; ∂Vb(e;α)
∂α
< 0, as shown in
Proposition 2. Thus, fulfilling the relational contract is less attractive to the
principal.
Depending on the overall impact of the agents’ propensity for envy on the
credibility constraint, the marginal interest rate r increases or decreases. The
larger this interest rate is, the greater is the range of interest rates for which
the principal may credibly commit and relational contracts are feasible.
Both r and e are implicitly defined as the solution of the following 2 ×
2− system consisting of the binding credibility constraint and the tangency
condition (see Figure 1):
r = Vb(e;α)
b(e;α)
r ∂b(e;α)
∂e
= ∂Vb(e;α)
∂e
(13)
Conducting a comparative-statics analysis of r with respect to α, we derive
the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that performance is non-verifiable. Then an in-
creasing propensity for envy may enhance the feasibility of the relational con-
tract. This is the case, if and only if, at e = e, the following condition holds:
p (e) >
(c (e) + U0) p
′ (e) + c′ (e)
p′ (e) + c′ (e)
. (14)
15Mathematically, this follows from equation (6) as ∂b(e;α)∂α < 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
The necessary and sufficient condition (14) assures that the incentive
effect outweighs the inequity premium effect regarding the credibility con-
straint. The principal’s incentive to renege on the bonus payments is suf-
ficiently small such that the negative impact of envy on the continuation
profit is overcompensated. Intuitively, the condition requires the continua-
tion profit Vb to react less strongly to an increase in the degree of envy than
the bonus payment b.16 Note that satisfaction of the condition demands the
sum of effort costs and alternative utility to be smaller than unity which is
inherently fulfilled due to the model setup.17 The smaller this sum the more
probable the feasibility-enhancing effect of envy is to arise and the stronger
the effect is.18 Further, from condition (14) can be inferred that the effect
is more likely to exist if the precision of the signal is large and the effort
elasticity of costs is small.19
Thus, we find that a high propensity for envy may be advantageous for
the principal regarding her commitment power. Under the above condition
(14), reputational equilibria can be sustained for a greater range of interest
rates with envious agents, i.e., the credibility constraint is softened. Hence,
there exist cases where the principal can build up a long-term contractual
relationship with inequity averse agents and realize profits whereas with in-
equity neutral agents this is impossible.
Figure 2 qualitatively illustrates our results for the case that condition
(14) is satisfied and, hence, the marginal interest rate r increases in the
16Mathematically, by quation (30), this is the case if the continuation-profit elasticity
is smaller in absolute terms than the bonus elasticity both with respect to the degree of
envy;
∣∣∣∣∂Vb∂α αVb
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣ ∂b∂α αb
∣∣∣∣.
17To verify this observe that the principal’s expected profit (10) becomes negative once
p(e) < c (e) +αp(e) (1− p(e)) b (e;α) +U0. In this case, the principal would not engage in
the contract. Moreover, p(e) may not exceed unity. Accordingly, c (e) + U0 can never be
greater than unity.
18In the Appendix, we illustrate the impact of the alternative utility and the cost func-
tion on the effect’s magnitude with the help of a numerical example. It reveals the effect
to increase with decreasing U0 and c (e).
19Note that condition (14) can be reformulated in terms of elasticities with respect to
effort: p (e) > ((c (e) + U0) θp (e) + βc (e)) / (θp (e) + βc (e)), where θ denotes the elasticity
of the success probability, i.e., the precision of the signal, and β is the elasticity of costs.
14
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agents’ propensity for envy. The figure shows the principal’s profit under the
optimal relational contract, V ∗b (r;α), for any level of r and two degrees of
envy, αL < αH . The solid curve depicts her profit if agents exhibit a certain
propensity for envy captured by αL. The dashed curve depicts her profit for
agents with a higher propensity for envy, αH .
20
PSfrag replacements
V ∗b (r; αL)
V ∗b (r; αH)
r (αL) r (αH) r¯ (αL) r¯ (αH)rˆ
r
Figure 2: Profits for two degrees of envy, αH > αL ≥ 0, when condition (14) is satisfied.
As can be seen in the figure, for a given propensity for envy α and suffi-
ciently low interest rates r, i.e., interest rates below the lower interest thresh-
old, r ≤ r (α), a relational contract is feasible and the optimal effort level e∗
is implemented by the principal; Vb (e
∗;α) is realized. For a range of interest
rates, r (α) < r ≤ r (α), effort e is adapted such that credibility requirements
are fulfilled. Profits in the optimum, Vb (e;α), decrease in this range as the
interest rate increases. Once the interest rate is larger than the upper inter-
est threshold, r > r (α), the credibility constraint can no longer be satisfied
20The figure illustrates the case where the two degrees of envy are not too different. The
case of a large difference in envy is discussed in the text below.
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by a reduction pf the induced effort level.21 Hence, relational contracts are
infeasible, and profits drop to zero.
Considering two degrees of envy, αH > αL ≥ 0, the foregoing results allow
for conclusions regarding the relative profitability of the relational contracts.
As illustrated by Figure 2, the relative performance of the contracts depends
on the degrees of envy and the firm’s interest rate. In particular, Proposition
2 implies that for any r < r (αL) profits with less envious agents exceed those
with more envious agents; V ∗b (r, αH) < V
∗
b (r, αL).
Moreover, by Proposition 3, the upper interest threshold r (α) is increas-
ing in α, implying that r (αL) < r (αH). For any r in-between the two upper
thresholds, i.e., r ∈ (r (αL) , r (αH)], relational contracts are feasible with
more envious agents whereas the principal cannot credibly commit herself
when dealing with less envious ones. Thus positive profits are realized only
with the former; V ∗b (r, αH) > V
∗
b (r, αL) = 0.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 thus implies that there exists a critical
value r̂ with r (αL) < r̂ ≤ r (αL) such that for any r ∈ (r̂, r (αH)] continuation
profits from employing more envious agents exceed those from employing less
envious ones; V ∗b (r, αH) > V
∗
b (r, αL).
Concerning the value of r̂, one can distinguish two cases that depend
on the particular difference in the degrees of envy. The case of a suffi-
ciently small difference is illustrated in Figure 2. Observe that in the figure
V ∗b (r (αL) , αH) > V
∗
b (r (αL) , αL). Thus, the two profit curves intersect at a
value r̂ < r (αL), and there is a region of interest rates for which continuation
profits from employing more envious agents exceed those from employing less
envious ones even if contracts with both types of agents are feasible (shaded
area).22
If, however, the difference in the degrees of envy is sufficiently large, the
figure looks slightly different. Then the dashed curve lies below the solid one
21See the Appendix for numerical examples of the lower and upper interest thresholds;
r (α) and r (α).
22For the example functions used in Figure 1 and, e.g., values of αL = 0.2, αH = 0.8 or
αL = 2.5, αH = 3.0 such an intersection of the profit curves exists. See the Appendix for a
plot replicating Figure 2 based on numerical solutions to the model for the latter example.
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for any r < r (αL), i.e., V
∗
b (r, αH) < V
∗
b (r, αL). Hence, V
∗
b (r (αL) , αH) ≤
V ∗b (r (αL) , αL) such that r̂ coincides with r (αL), and the shaded area does
not exist. Hence, the principal favors the more envious agents over the less
envious ones only if contracts with the latter type of agents are infeasible.
The following corollary summarizes the above derived insights with re-
spect to the beneficial effects of envy regarding the profitability of relational
contracts.
Corollary 1. Suppose that performance is non-verifiable and condition (14)
is satisfied, and let αH > αL ≥ 0.
Then there exists a range of interest rates r̂ < r ≤ r (αH) for which the
principal prefers to employ more envious agents over less envious ones. In
particular,
(i) if the difference in the agents’ degree of envy, αH−αL, is sufficiently small,
then r̂ < r (αL). Thus, there is a range of interest rates r̂ < r ≤ r (αL) for
which relational contracts are feasible with both more and less envious agents
but profits with more envious ones are larger (see Figure 2).
(ii) if the difference in the degrees of envy, αH − αL, is sufficiently large,
then r̂ = r (αL), and profits with more envious agents exceed profits with less
envious ones only if relational contracts with the latter are infeasible.
To put it differently, the principal definitely prefers to employ more envi-
ous over less envious agents whenever commitment is feasible only with more
envious ones. Given that agents are not too different with respect to their
propensities for envy, the same holds true for an extended range of interest
rates for which, albeit contracts with both types of agents feasible, profits
with more envious agents exceed those with less envious ones.
4. Discussion and Extensions
In the preceding sections we have analyzed peer-independent performance
pay and focused on the trade-off between credibility and the costs of inequity
aversion. In doing so we have ignored contracts based upon peer-dependent
performance evaluation like rank-order tournaments and group bonus con-
tracts. However, these alternative compensation schemes have interesting
features in our setup. In particular, the former avoids credibility problems
17
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altogether. Yet, as we will show, this comes at the cost of a larger inequity
premium. At the other extreme, a group bonus contract excludes the pos-
sibility of unequal pay. We find, however, that it amplifies the credibility
problem. In the following, we briefly outline the two alternative types of
compensation contracts for the case of envious agents and discuss the im-
plications for our results. In particular, in sections 4.1 and 4.2, we verify
that the restriction to individual bonus contracts is meaningful for a range
of sufficiently high interest rates. Moreover, in section 4.3, we demonstrate
that employing more envious agents may still be preferred by the principal,
even if she has the choice between contracts based on individual, group, or
relative performance.
4.1. Group Bonus Scheme
In a group scheme, the principal offers each agent a compensation contract{
wB, BYiYj
}
, where wB is a guaranteed fixed wage and BYiYj a (per-worker)
group bonus which is paid contingent upon both agents’ performances Yi and
Yj in the respective period. Whenever paid out, the group bonus is paid to
both agents such that inequity in payoffs never occurs. Depending on the sig-
nals’ realizations, the group incentive scheme allows for the implementation
of three different bonus payments, B01, B10, and B11. A thorough analysis
of the group scheme under non-verifiable performance is conducted by Kragl
(2009). In the following, we summarize some of her results which are relevant
for the current analysis and their intuition.
In the repeated game, the optimal group scheme implements the smallest
possible bonus payment for a given level of effort in order to facilitate cred-
ibility. Depending on the value of p (e) at the desired effort level, either of
two group bonus schemes is optimal.23 With p (e) ≤ 0.5, a group bonus is
paid whenever at least one agent is successful. In contrast, with p (e) > 0.5, a
group bonus is paid only if both agents are simultaneously successful. All re-
sults concerning the comparison of the group to the individual bonus scheme
equivalently hold for either case. In the following, we only outline the case
p (e) ≤ 0.5 and discuss the arising trade-off.
Assume that the principal promises to pay a bonus B to both agents
whenever at least one agent is successful. In the single-period game, agent
23For a comprehensive analysis and the derivation of this result see Kragl (2009).
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i’s expected utility is
E[Ui|ei, ej] = wB + (p (ei) + p (ej)− p (ei) p (ej))B − c (ei) , i 6= j, (15)
where ei and ej denote the respective effort levels of worker i and his co-
worker j. Observe that the agents’ inequity averse preference structure has
no effect on their respective utilities in the presence of the group scheme. In
the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, the first-order
condition of (15) yields the incentive-compatible bonus for implementing a
given effort level e:
B (e) =
c′ (e)
(1− p (e)) p′ (e) (16)
Comparing equations (6) and (16) reveals that the size of the incentive-
compatible group bonus B (e) exceeds the size of the individual bonus b (e;α)
for any given effort level e and any level of α ≥ 0. Intuitively, the group bonus
introduces a positive externality effect of an agent’s effort on the other agent’s
expected payoff. As a result, the probability of obtaining the bonus is less
responsive to changes in effort in the group scheme than in the individual
scheme, and, hence, the group bonus must be larger to elicit an equivalent
effort level. Moreover, in contrast to the individual scheme, in the group
scheme there is no incentive-strengthening effect of envy.
In the repeated game, the principal sets B,wB, and e to maximize ex-
pected profits per agent and period subject to incentive compatibility, partic-
ipation, and credibility constraints. Given that the participation constraint
is binding, we can eliminate wB such that the principal’s problem becomes:
V ∗B (r) := max
e,B
VB (e) = p (e)− c (e)− U0
s.t.
(ICB) (1− p (e)) p′ (e)B = c′ (e)
(CCB) B ≤ VB(e)r
(17)
From the optimization program can be inferred that, in the group scheme,
as long as the interest rate is such that the credibility constraint is not
binding, first-best effort levels eFB can be implemented, regardless of the
agents’ propensity for envy. Observe that, by equation (10), this is also true
for profits in the individual scheme for the case of non-envious agents, i.e.,
19
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V ∗B (r) = V
∗
b (r; 0) . However, as the interest rate increases, in both types
of contract the respective credibility constraints become binding at some
interest rate. Since the group bonus is larger, B
(
eFB
)
> b
(
eFB; 0
)
, (CCB)
necessarily becomes binding for a lower value of r than (CC). In other words,
V ∗B (r) starts declining for a smaller value of r than V
∗
b (r; 0).
Altogether, with non-envious agents, the principal is never worse off us-
ing an individual bonus contract as compared to using a group bonus con-
tract, i.e., V ∗b (r; 0) ≥ V ∗B (r). Moreover, in section 3 we have shown that
for sufficiently large interest rates the principal prefers envious agents to
non-envious agents using an individual bonus scheme for a range of interest
rates.24 Thus, a fortiori, for this range of interest rates, she also prefers the
individual scheme to the group bonus scheme when agents are envious. We
illustrate this result in Figure 3(a). Observe that the principal indeed prefers
the individual bonus scheme for any interest rate r > r˜ given that agents are
envious.
(a) (b)
PSfrag replacements
V ∗B (r)
V ∗b (r;α)V ∗b (r;α)
V ∗∆ (α)
r˜ ˜˜r r
r
Figure 3: Profits in (a) the individual and the group scheme and (b) the individual scheme
and the tournament for a given degree of envy, α > 0, provided that condition (14) is
satisfied.
4.2. Rank-order Tournament
In a rank-order tournament, the principal does not face any credibility
problem since she can ex ante commit to paying out a given sum of wages
24This holds when condition (14) is satisfied. See Proposition 3.
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in each period.25 In the current context, suppose she offers a fixed wage w∆
to each agent and distributes a prize ∆ among the agents in each period. In
particular, she pays ∆ to the winner if one exists. When contributions are
equal, she pays ∆
2
to each agent.26 In the single-period game, when exerting
effort ei while his co-worker exerts effort ej agent i’s expected utility is
E[Ui|ei, ej] = w∆ + (1 + p (ei)− p (ej)) ∆2 − c (ei)−αp (ej) (1− p (ei)) ∆, i 6= j. (18)
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, the first-order
condition of (18) yields the incentive-compatible tournament prize for imple-
menting effort e:
∆ (e;α) =
c′ (e)(
1
2
+ αp (e)
)
p′ (e)
(19)
Comparing equations (19) and (6), we find that the principal has to offer a
tournament prize larger than the individual bonus for any e and any α ≥ 0,
∆ (e;α) > b (e;α) . Intuitively, by paying out ∆
2
when agents are both either
successful or not, the principal avoids the credibility problem but weakens
the incentives. Thus, to induce the same effort level, the principal is forced
to raise ∆ above b. Given that agents are envious, this is not innocuous.
Specifically, it lowers the principal’s profit as shown below.
The principal sets ∆, w∆, and e to maximize expected profits per agent
and period subject to incentive compatibility, participation, and credibility
constraints. Given that the participation constraint is binding, we can elim-
inate w∆, and the principal’s problem becomes
V ∗∆ (α) := max
e,∆
V∆ (e;α) = p(e)− c (e)− αp(e) (1− p(e)) ∆− U0,
s.t. (19).
(20)
25Thus, a tournament is no relational contract as it solves the non-verifiability problem.
In contrast to bonus contracts, however, tournaments suffer from collusion and sabotage,
see e.g. Lazear (1989).
26Observe that in the current context, randomizing and paying ∆ to only one of the
agents would necessarily worsen the outcome due to the inequity aversion of the parties. In
this sense, the tournament considered is relatively fair compared to standard tournament
models with continuous signals, see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981). In particular, in our
set-up the probability of equal signal realizations is non-zero as signals are binary.
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Observe that, by equations (10) and (20), tournament profits V ∗∆ (α) are
lower than profits in the individual incentive scheme V ∗b (r;α) for any α > 0
and sufficiently small interest rates.27 This is due to the fact that, with
envious agents, the relative payment structure induces even higher inequity
costs than the individual bonus contract.28 Note, however, that in contrast
to profits from the individual scheme, tournament profits are unaffected by
an increase in the interest rate. Thus, for sufficiently high interest rates, the
tournament outperforms the individual incentive scheme as the credibility
problem becomes paramount in the latter. Figure 3(b) illustrates this result.
For any interest rate r < ˜˜r, the principal prefers the individual bonus contract
to the tournamtent when agents are envious. This is true irrespective of
whether condition (14) is fulfilled. Yet, if condition (14) holds, the individual
bonus contract is superior to the tournament for a greater range of interest
rates.
4.3. Effects of an Increasing Propensity for Envy
In the foregoing section we found that, with envious agents, the individual
bonus structure remains preferable for a meaningful range of interest rates.
In the remainder, we show that the intuition of Proposition 3 and Corollary
1 carries over to the comparative analysis of all three incentive schemes. In
particular, we demonstrate that employing more envious agents may still be
preferred by the principal even if she can select one of the three considered
incentive contracts. Derived from the underlying functions’ characteristics,
Figure 4 qualitatively illustrates exactly such a case.29 It sketches optimal
profits under the different incentive schemes for two different degrees of envy,
0 < αL < αH . The solid curves depict profits for αL, the dashed curves those
for αH , respectively.
Note that profits in the group scheme are not affected by an increase in
α. In contrast, tournament profits decrease when α increases from αL to αH
for any interest rate. By Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, for the considered
27Note that, for non-envious agents, the tournament is as least as good as the individual
bonus scheme for any interest rate. However, once agents exhibit some propensity for envy,
the individual contract is superior for a considerable range of interest rates.
28See Grund and Sliwka (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of the inequity costs in
tournaments.
29We replicate Figure 4 by plotting a numerical example in the Appendix.
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V ∗∆ (αL)
V ∗∆ (αH)
r
rˆ ˆˆr
Figure 4: Profits in the individual scheme, the group scheme, and the tournament for two
degrees of envy, αH > αL > 0, given that condition (14) is satisfied.
increase in α, profits in the individual incentive scheme decrease in α for
interest rates r < r̂ but increase in α for interest rates r > r̂ as long as a
contract is feasible and given that condition (14) holds. The figure reveals
that for any interest rate r ∈
(
r̂, ̂̂r), the principal indeed prefers to use the
individual bonus scheme and to employ more envious agents rather than to
implement a tournament with less envious agents and certainly rather than
to implement a group scheme. The shaded area depicts the supplemental
profit the principal may realize by employing more envious agents under
an individual bonus contract. Observe that for any pair (αL, αH) such a
region exists only if V ∗b (0;αH) > V
∗
∆ (αL). This condition implies that the
difference αH − αL must not be too large. Moreover, a sufficient condition
for the region to exist is V ∗b (r̂;αH) = V
∗
b (r̂;αL) > V
∗
∆ (αL). Geometrically,
the two individual profit curves must hence intersect above the line depicting
the tournament profit with less envious agents.30
30Given the functions used in Figure 1, e.g., for the pair (αL = 2.5, αH = 3) these con-
ditions are fulfilled. See the Appendix for the plot of the numerical solutions to the model
for this example.
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5. Concluding Remarks
We consider optimal individual incentive schemes in a principal-agent re-
lationship with two identical agents who exhibit horizontal disadvantageous
inequity aversion. As there are only subjective performance measures avail-
able to evaluate the agents’ performances, the bonus contracts are enforced
in a reputational equilibrium.
The analysis focuses on the impact of the agents’ propensity for envy
on the principal’s commitment power that determines the feasibility of the
relational contract. There are two countervailing effects at work: On the one
hand, as agency costs increase due to the presence of envy, the principal’s
profits from the contract decrease as agents become more envious. Thus,
continuation of the relational contract becomes less attractive. On the other
hand, envy serves as an incentive-strengthening device. This implies that the
principal has to pay a lower bonus to implement the same effort given that
agents are envious, thereby reducing her benefit from a one-time deviation.
We identify a necessary and sufficient condition assuring that the principal’s
ability to commit increases as agents become more envious. This implies that
the principal prefers to employ more envious agents over less envious ones
for a range of high interest rates.
In our paper, we abstract from empathy captured via the parameter β > 0
in the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Some studies claim that people
might actually be better off if their payoff exceeds the payoffs of others in
their peer group, implying that these people are spiteful and/or show pref-
erences for status.31 This is contrary to empathy and could be captured
by β < 0. Assuming these kinds of preferences, in addition to envy, would
strengthen our results as status seeking and spitefulness respectively lead to
stronger incentives on the one hand and act contrary to the expected disu-
tility from envy on the other hand.32 Thus, the higher status concerns or
spiteful behavior, the more probable the positive effect of envy on relational
contracts is achieved.
To complete the analysis, we outline two alternative types of contracts,
both based upon peer-dependent performance pay. First, we briefly consider
31See e.g. Loewenstein et al. (1989), Moldovanu et al. (2007), and Brown et al. (2008).
32See Grund and Sliwka (2005) for spitefulness in the context of tournaments.
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a group bonus contract which inherently avoids unequal outcomes and thus
implies an inequity premium of zero, but amplifies the credibility problem.
Second, we look at a rank-order tournament where the principal does not face
a credibility problem, but increased inequity costs instead. We show that
there exists a beneficial effect of envy, which carries over to the comparative
analysis of all three incentive schemes.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs for Section 2
Proof of symmetry and uniqueness of the Nash-equilibrium in the single-
period game. Both agents maximize their expected utility (4). The respec-
tive first-order conditions are given by
p′ (ei) b− c′ (ei) + αp′ (ei) p (ej) b = 0, (21)
p′ (ej) b− c′ (ej) + αp′ (ej) p (ei) b = 0. (22)
Combining both equations implies
c′ (ei)
p′ (ei) (1 + αp (ej))
=
c′ (ej)
p′ (ej) (1 + αp (ei))
(23)
⇔ c
′ (ei) (1 + αp (ei))
p′ (ei)
=
c′ (ej) (1 + αp (ej))
p′ (ej)
. (24)
Both sides of equation (24) represent a function of the agent’s effort level:
c′ (e) (1 + αp (e))
p′ (e)
(25)
Since (25) is monotonically increasing in e, equation (24) is satisfied if and
only if ei = ej = e. To see this, consider the derivative of (25) with respect
to effort:
(1 + αp (e))p′ (e) c′′ (e) + αp′ (e)2 c′ (e)− p′′ (e) c′ (e) (1 + αp (e))
p′ (e)2
. (26)
As α, p (e) , p′ (e) , c′′ (e) , c′ (e) > 0, and p′′ < 0, (26) is strictly positive. More-
over, as e maximizes the agents’ concave utility function (4), the equilibrium
is also unique. 
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A.2. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3. Differentiation of r yields
∂r
∂α
=
(
∂Vb
∂e
∣∣
e=e
b− Vb ∂b∂e
∣∣
e=e
)
∂e
∂α
+ ∂Vb
∂α
∣∣
e=e
b− Vb ∂b∂α
∣∣
e=e
b2
. (27)
The system (13) implies
∂Vb
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=e
b (e;α)− Vb(e;α) ∂b
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=e
= 0. (28)
With equation (28), (27) simplifies to
∂r
∂α
=
∂Vb
∂α
∣∣
e=e
b− Vb ∂b∂α
∣∣
e=e
b2
. (29)
To decide upon the effect of α on r the sign of equation (29) is crucial:
sign
(
∂r
∂α
)
= sign
(
∂Vb
∂α
∣∣∣∣
e=e
b− Vb ∂b
∂α
∣∣∣∣
e=e
)
(30)
Substituting Vb as given in equation (10) and with
∂Vb (e;α)
∂α
= −b (1− p (e)) p (e)− α (1− p (e)) p (e) ∂b
∂α
∣∣∣∣
e=e
equation (30) further simplifies to
sign
(
∂r
∂α
)
= sign
(
−b2 (1− p (e)) p (e)− (p (e)− c (e)− U0) ∂b
∂α
)
. (31)
With b (e;α) = c
′(e)
(1+αp(e))p′(e) as given in (6) and
∂b (e;α)
∂α
= − c
′ (e) p (e) p′ (e)
((1 + αp (e)) p′ (e))2
equation (31) results in
sign
(
∂r
∂α
)
= sign (−c′ (e) (1− p (e)) + (p (e)− c (e)− U0) p′ (e)) . (32)
Thus,
∂r
∂α
> 0 iff p (e) > (c(e)+U0)p
′(e)+c′(e)
p′(e)+c′(e) .

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A.3. Numerical Examples and Plots
A.3.1. The effect of envy on the interest thresholds
For the following numerical example we assume p (e) = 1 − exp (−e) and
c (e;K) = Ke2 such that condition (14) is satisfied. We consider two ex-
emplary degrees of envy (αL = 0, αH = 1) and two values of U0 and K,
respectively. The table below lists numerical solutions to our model for the
interest thresholds r (α) and r (α). The table illustrates the effect of envy on
the principal’s commitment power as it shows the increase in the respective
interest threshold levels that results from an increase in α.
lower interest threshold r (α) upper interest threshold r (α)
U0 K r (0 ) r (1 ) r (0 ) r (1 )
0.36 0.075 0.25 0.39 0.53 0.59
0.39 0.075 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.45
0.39 0.05 0.28 0.51 0.74 0.93
The examples reveal a converse impact of both parameters, U0 and K,
on the magnitude of the effect of envy; with decreasing values of each, the
spans r (1) − r (0) and r (1) − r (0) increase. Consider, for example, the
upper interest threshold. When U0 falls from 0.39 to 0.36 and K remains
constant, the difference in the interest levels increases from 2% to 6%. With
U0 constant, a decrease in K from 0.075 to 0.05 causes an increase in the
difference of the upper thresholds from 2% to 19%.
Additionally, the plots in Figure 5 below graphically illustrate the effect
of the parameters U0 and K on our results for the functional forms given
above and for a continuous range of different parameter values. The left
picture presents their impact on the magnitude of the feasibility-enhancing
effect of envy for a change of α from 0 to 1 as it plots the difference of the
respective upper interest thresholds. The right picture shows the impact on
the upper interest threshold level for α = 0.2.
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Figure 5: Effects of U0 and K on the magnitude of the feasibility-enhancing effect of envy
(left) and the level of the upper interest threshold (right).
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A.3.2. Comparison of individual bonus scheme, group bonus scheme, and
tournament
Numerically solving for the principal’s profits in the repeated game, V ∗b (r;α),
V ∗B (r), V
∗
∆ (α), we replicate Figure 4 and thus implicitly Figure 2. As before,
we assume p (e) = 1 − exp (−e), c (e) = 1
8
e2, and U0 = 0.1. The following
plot in Figure 6 exemplifies the impact of envy on the relative profitability
of the incentive schemes with αL = 2.5 and αH = 3.0 based on the numerical
solutions to the model for the example functions.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
interest rate
pr
of
its
 
 
ind (αL)
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tourn (αL)
tourn (αH)
group
Figure 6: Plot of the profits in the individual scheme, the group scheme, and the tourna-
ment for two degrees of envy, αH = 3.0 and αL = 2.5.
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